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It is now hardly disputable that classical international law was complicit 
in the imperial project and the exploitation which accompanied it. … 
[I]f we understand how colonialism has shaped the fundamental structures 
of international law, then it might become possible … for us to rethink a 
system of international law that might in some way make good on its 
promise to further international justice.1 
 
A good deal of the recent historiography of the early modern law of nature and 
nations — jus naturae et gentium — has been critical. This applies in particular to the 
literature that ties its history to the emergence of European colonialism and 
imperialism.2 By ‘critical’ I do not mean pejorative or condemnatory, although much 
of the scholarship has been this too, especially that coming from postcolonial studies. 
Rather, I mean critical in the philosophical-historical sense of positing norms that 
project a history of what jus naturae et gentium should have been or could have 
become, as opposed to a history of what it contingently happened to be. In our 
epigraph, Antony Anghie thus criticises the imperialist complicity of early modern jus 
gentium by projecting a global international justice whose ‘promise’ it might have 
realised but did not, thereby treating the role of jus gentium in European colonialism 
                                                
1  Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 8, 12.  
2  Research for this paper was made possible by the award of an Australian Professorial 
Fellowship. A longer version was presented at the ‘Transpositions of Empire’ symposium, 
held in Prato 20-22 April 2009. I am grateful to the other participants, especially to my co-
organiser, Shaunnagh Dorsett, and to Brett Bowden, Mark Hickford, Barry Hindess, David 
Saunders and Gary Wickham for their comments. 
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as a detour from its otherwise global historical development. But defenders of jus 
gentium in relation to colonialism rely on the same kind of critical or philosophical 
historiography as its critics; as their central claim is that at least some versions of jus 
gentium did indeed realise norms of global justice, thereby becoming what they 
should have been, and making it possible to condemn European imperialism as 
unjust.3 The postcolonial critics of early modern jus gentium and its philosophical 
defenders thus share a fundamental philosophical-historical platform: namely, that 
there is global principle of justice capable of including European and non-European 
peoples within the ‘universal history’ of its unfolding. They differ only over whether, 
or to what degree, jus gentium succeeded in realising this principle, and thus stands 
condemned or vindicated by this history. 
In what follows I develop some arguments skeptical of this critical- or 
philosophical-historical approach to early modern jus naturae et gentium, and sketch 
the broad lines of an alternative approach, drawing on an array of contextual-
historical studies. I argue that the early modern uses of jus gentium were indeed 
particularistic or Eurocentric — in the dual sense of being regional to and within 
Europe — but more profoundly so than either its modern critics or defenders have 
grasped. That is because these uses — including those justifying the intrusion of 
European missionaries, traders, and states into New-World countries and cultures — 
could not have been understood by their exponents as failing to realise a truly global 
normative order or ‘international justice’, and cannot be understood by modern 
historians in this way either. Against its modern critics and defenders, I argue that the 
‘regional’ — geointellectual and geoethical — character of European jus gentium 
discourses cannot be comprehended in relation to a transcendent global justice and 
universal history that these discourses failed to realise. Instead, their regional 
character can only be grasped by situating them in the immanent conflicts among the 
rival intellectual cultures on which they were based, and the clashing religious and 
political programs in which these discourses were anchored. I argue that to the extent 
that the particularistic limits of European jus gentium have become intelligible, then 
this has occurred neither through a universal reason’s philosophical recovery of 
global norms, nor through a universal history’s sociological globalisation of such 
                                                
3  For a recent example, see Georg Cavallar, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and 
Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’, 
Journal of the History of International Law 10 (2008), 181-209.  
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norms over time. Rather, these limits became visible only when the universalistic 
claims of jus gentium were fractured from without by forces released in two a-rational 
historical developments: firstly, by the ‘Reformation’ splintering of European cultures 
into armed religious and political regions, which gave rise to rival forms of jus 
naturae et gentium each claiming universality; and second by resistance that jus 
gentium — and other ‘universal’ forms of European religious and philosophical 
thought — met in New World encounters, but only to the extent that his resistance 
was armed and forcible. 
If this is so then we cannot approach the history of jus naturae et gentium as if it 
were governed by a global principle of justice: one whose unfolding in a universal 
history imbues us ‘critical’ moderns with a truly cosmopolitan norm of international 
justice, against which we can comfortably measure the moral deficits of our 
ancestors. Rather we must approach this history at the convergence of two lines of 
historiographic inquiry: firstly into the disparate intellectual sources — the 
metaphysical anthropologies and cosmologies, the political philosophies and juridical 
cultures — from which rival jus gentium discourses were fashioned; and second into 
the conflicting religious, juridical and political programs in whose interests jus 
gentium discourses were fashioned, and to whose historical fate they were tied. This 
history of jus naturae et gentium is thus not that of the revelation of its particularism 
in the course of a universal history of reason, at the centre of which sits its colonialist 
use. Rather it is a history tied to the unforeseeable and uncontrollable outcomes of the 
conflicts between the religious and political programs in which jus gentium was 
anchored — including inter alia colonising programs — among which outcomes are 
to be found modern philosophical and contextual historiography themselves.  
The paper develops this line of argument in four stages, arguing that the critical 
or philosophical historiography of jus gentium ‘Eurocentrism’ is embedded in the 
same array of Eurocentric intellectual cultures as jus gentium itself (I); that jus 
naturae et gentium was not born as the ideology of early modern European 
colonialism (or modern imperialism) but emerged in variegated forms over a longer 
period, as the shifting matrix for ordering the relations between European religious, 
juridical, and political cultures (II); that jus gentium did not consist fundamentally in 
true (universal) or ideological (particularist) ideas, but in deep-seated intellectual 
cultures whose role was to form a particular ‘persona’ or way of acceding to truth 
(III); and finally that the limits or particularism of jus gentium discourses were 
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revealed not by a universal idea of justice that they failed to realise, but by irreducible 
conflicts among the religious, juridical and political programs in which they were 
anchored, all of which produced regional conceptions of justice claiming to be 
‘universal’ (IV). 
I 
As exemplified in our epigraph, in treating early modern jus naturae et gentium 
as the ideological origin of modern — state-centred, imperialist — international law, 
critical historiography grounds its critique of jus gentium particularism or regionality 
on social-theoretic and philosophical premises tacitly assumed to be universal. It is 
highly likely, though, that the theoretical and philosophical premises of this critique 
are themselves European-specific; that is, accessible only to those iteratively trained 
in an array of regional university-based European intellectual cultures.4 If so then we 
will have to give up the idea that the particularism or regionality of jus gentium 
discourses can be comprehended and condemned on the philosophical or theoretical 
basis of its failure to be universal. 
In order to argue this case in the space available, we can construct a composite of 
the critical historiography of jus gentium, acknowledging a degree of over-unification 
in doing so. Centrally, this historiography claims that early modern jus naturae et 
gentium originated as the ideological justification for the European colonisation of the 
New World, and that a state-centred and imperialistic modern international law is its 
direct descendant.5 The core intellectual components of jus naturae et gentium are 
thus supposed to have been ideas or doctrines declaring the intellectual and moral 
                                                
4  For examples of the emerging discussion of the regional character of European 
philosophical cultures, see Karol Bal, Volker Caysa, and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, (eds.), 
Philosophie und Regionalität (Breslau: Wroclaw University Press, 1999).  
5  A founding statement is provided in Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, An Introduction 
to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (Oxford: Clarendond Press, 1967). 
Alexandrowicz formulated the paradigm according to which the colonialising role of jus 
gentium is effected through its ‘positivist’ construction of a territorial sovereignty foreign to 
New-World peoples. More recently this paradigm can be found in Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of Interional Law; S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Brett Bowden, ‘The Colonial 
Origins of International Law: European Expansion and the Classical Standard of 
Civilization’, Journal of the History of International Law 7 (2005), 1-23. A positive version 
of this history, written from within the tradition of Catholic natural law, and arguing that 
Spanish colonialism prompted the emergence of a truly universal jus gentium, had already 
appeared in the 1930s. See, James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: 
Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 1932).  
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superiority of European culture over non-European ones, as a means of disguising 
hence facilitating the cultural and political domination of the former over the latter.6 
Pre-eminent and continuous among these ideas were several key European political 
and cultural concepts — state sovereignty,7 the rule of law,8 agricultural and 
commercial society9 — that jus naturae et gentium represented as universally 
grounded in man’s moral nature, or as indicative of the perfection of human 
civilisation. In allowing non-European cultures to be viewed as particular in relation 
to European universality, or as uncivilised in relation to the process of European 
civilisation, it was early modern jus gentium that supplied the ideological theory for 
the practice of European colonialism and imperialism, now understood in terms of the 
coercive imposition of particularistic European norms and concepts on non-European 
peoples. In a typical example, Anghie thus argues that the Dominican Thomist 
theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546) used a ‘secular’ jus naturae et gentium 
in order to foist a Eurocentric conception of state sovereignty on the South American 
Indians as a means of repressing their ‘cultural difference’ and facilitating their 
repression.10 Similarly, the Swiss republican Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) is accused 
of using jus gentium to universalise a European conception of agricultural cultivation 
as a means of constituting the South American nations as ‘rogue states’ that ‘must be 
exterminated’.11 
The tacitly universalist presumption sustaining this account — that is, the 
presumption that relations between European and New-World peoples should and 
could have been rendered fair and just in a shared global normative order — draws on 
three powerful intellectual cultures. First, based ultimately in the Catholic natural-law 
anthropology of man as a the bearer of a self-realising essence or ‘rational and 
                                                
6  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, ch. 1; Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 1-31; 
Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law’; Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal 
Sovereignty: Reflections on Race, State, and Nation (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996); and 
Bruce Buchan, ‘The Empire of Political Thought: Civilization, Savagery and Perceptions of 
Indigenous Government’, History of the Human Sciences 18 (2005), 1-22.  
7  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, p. 16; Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty, pp. 39-
59; Bruce Buchan, ‘Civilisation, State Sovereignty and War: the Scottish Enlightenment and 
International Relations’, International Relations 20 (2006), 175-92.  
8  Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought, p. ?; Reynolds, Aboriginal 
Sovereignty, pp. 60-85. 
9  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 269-70; Bruce Buchan, ‘Traffick of Empire: 
Trade, Treaty and Terra Nullius in Australia and North America, 1750-1800’, History 
Compass 5 (2007), 386-405.  
10  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 23-8. 
11  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 269-70 
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sociable nature’, is the doctrine that all ‘nations’ are corporate moral personalities — 
‘nation-persons’ — destined for self-realisation or ‘self-determination’ through 
political autonomy.12 This doctrine allows conquest and colonisation to be viewed as 
the unjust infringement of a universal right of national self-determination. Second, 
modern critical historiography also draws on a quite different conception of universal 
justice, namely as ‘cosmopolitan right’. This is grounded in the (de-facto Protestant) 
Kantian anthropology and cosmology of men as rational (noumenal) beings, destined 
by reason for harmonious sharing of the corporeal world, which makes conquest and 
colonisation both irrational and unjust.13 Finally, and more recently, postcolonial 
critique of ‘European law’ has drawn on the elaborate metaphorics of colonisation as 
the imposition of a European ‘self’ on a colonised ‘other’. This is based directly on 
the recondite metaphysics of transcendental phenomenology and ‘deconstruction’, 
according to which the self is a carapace of identity formed through the legalistic 
occlusion of the protean ‘difference’ of the ‘other’ (‘Being’). Colonisation is thus 
treated as if it were the project of constructing a repressive yet anxious ‘European’ 
identity — ‘The colonizer constructs himself as he constructs the colony’14 — that is 
destined to be undone through the self-manifesting ‘Being’ of the colonised ‘other’.15 
                                                
12  The modern iteration of this doctrine can be found in James Brown Scott, The 
Catholic Conception of International Law (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1934); and Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law. It was revived for postcolonial 
use in Alexandrowicz’s History of the Law of Nations in 1967 and forms the basis of Anaya’s 
Indigenous People’s in International Law (2004) and Reynolds’ Aboriginal Sovereignty 
(1996), while also informing Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and International Law 
(2004). It can also be found in implacable defence of Vitoria’s jus gentium in Brian Tierney, 
The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, 1150-
1625 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), pp. 255-87. 
13  Kant’s own articulation of the principle of cosmopolitan right — in terms of rational 
beings inhabiting a physical globe — has been reworked by Rawls and Habermas. Unlike the 
Catholic natural-law doctrine, here the focus is not on universal national self-determination 
but on global democratic will-formation, seen most clearly in John Rawls, The Law of 
Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); and Jürgen Habermas, ‘Does 
the Constitutionalisation of International Law Still have a Chance?’, in C. Cronin (ed.), The 
Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 155-93. See also Thomas Pogge, 
‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, Ethics 103 (1992), 48-75; Sharon Anderson-Gold, 
Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001); Georg 
Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1999); and Cavallar, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel’.  
14  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of 
the Vanishing Present (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 203.  
15  See, for example, Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Terminal Legality: Imperialism and the 
(De)composition of Law’, in D. Kirkby and C. Coleborne (eds.), Law, History, Colonialism: 
The Reach of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 9-25; Anghie, 
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Despite their different metaphysics — or perhaps simply because all are versions 
of European university metaphysics — these three doctrinal sources of the 
postcolonial critique (and defence) of jus gentium manage to converge in two 
ecumenical intellectual ‘clearing houses’: first in the doctrinal distinction between 
‘theory’ and ‘practice’; and second in a reciprocally related genre of universal or 
philosophical history, conceived as the unfolding of theory or rational principle in and 
through empirical historical events.16 Through the theory-practice distinction critique 
can treat jus gentium as divided between two fundamental domains: the universal 
ideas and rational norms through which man can be morally self-determining, and the 
self-interested desires or inclinations that tie his actions to particularistic material 
interests.17 This produces the bi-polar analysis that divides jus gentium into two 
exemplary forms: a global one characterised by ideas capable of universalising 
themselves in the material domain (truth); and a colonialist form characterised by 
ideas whose lack of purity places them at the disposal of particularistic material 
interests (ideology). Through the genre of universal philosophical history critique 
envisages the prospect of a universal idea or norm — not yet capable of empirical 
manifestation owing to the recalcitrance of particularistic interests — being 
progressively unfolded in ‘dialectical’ history through purely material means. The 
template for modern universal history is of course Kant’s account of the role of war 
and trade in globalising justice through a history possessing ‘cosmopolitan intent’.18 
If, however, we examine the three constructions of universal justice purporting to 
measure the European particularism of jus gentium, then it quickly becomes apparent 
that each is embedded in local intellectual culture — in a specific moral anthropology 
and cosmology — that is itself regional to and within Europe. Moreover, as we shall 
                                                                                                                                      
Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 8-9, 31-20; and, more generally, Spivak, A Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason; and Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993).  
16  For a more detailed discussion of these twin doctrines, see Ian Hunter, ‘Kant’s 
Cosmopolitanism from a Historical Viewpoint’, in B. Hindess and R. B. J. Walker (eds.), The 
Cost of Kant, forthcoming. 
17  The original and succinct formulation is to be found in Immanuel Kant, ‘On the 
Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice’, in M. J. 
Gregor (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 273-310. This bi-level intellectual architecture has of course become 
widespread across critical theory and philosophical history, with an exemplary recent use 
being supplied by Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).  
18  Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent’, in T. 
Humphrey (ed.), Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp.??  
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see in more detail in section III, these intellectual cultures are responsible not only for 
representing global justice in a particular form — as a world of self-determining 
nations, self-governing cosmopolitan rational beings, or self-transformative self-other 
dyads — but also for constituting different ways of knowing or acceding to the truth 
of global justice. Drawing on the long history of Christian Aristotelianism, Catholic 
natural law posits man as the bearer of a nascent ‘rational and sociable nature’ or self-
developing essence. The realisation or ‘perfection’ of this essence imbues man’s 
conduct with a teleological-developmental character that makes justice thinkable as 
‘self-determination’ and means that international justice will be thought in terms of 
the equal rights to self-determination of corporate moral persons or ‘nations’. 
Conversely, Kantian moral anthropology, developed in part as a Protestant rival to 
Thomist Aristotelianism, treats humanity as a community of pure intelligences whose 
wills must be harmonised to achieve a just (cosmopolitan) occupation of the surface 
of the earth.19 For its part the post-Kantian metaphysics of transcendental 
phenomenology requires European states to be thought of as inauthentic selves 
formed through the occlusion of a self-manifesting ‘other’ — represented here by 
colonised peoples — thereby constituting the postcolonial theorist as someone who 
accedes to knowledge of justice in the form of the renovatory self-manifestation of 
the repressed other.20 
There are thus good prima facie reasons for suggesting that when the universalist 
critique of jus gentium presumes a norm of global justice — when it is tacitly or 
explicitly asserted that all nations have a right to self-determination, or that all states 
should harmonise their interests in accordance with a principle of ‘cosmopolitan 
right’, or that all colonisers construct their identity through ‘anxious’ occlusion of the 
colonised — this amounts to neither more nor less than the iteration of a series of 
regional European metaphysical cultures, each claiming to constitute a universal norm 
of ‘international justice’. It is quite implausible to imagine that the anthropological 
and cosmological underpinnings of these European political metaphysics will 
harmonise with those of non-European political metaphysics: for example, political 
mythographies teaching that the nation has been chosen by god, or that its denizens 
are the cyclical incarnations of divine beings; or cosmographies teaching that the 
                                                
19  For more, see Hunter, ‘Kant’s Cosmopolitanism’. 
20  Cf., Ian Hunter, ‘The Desire for Deconstruction: Derrida’s Metaphysics of Law’, 
Communication, Politics & Culture 41 (2008), 6-29.  
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world is organised around a privileged ‘middle kingdom’ — centre of civilisation —
or is divided into regions of the ‘abode of Islam’ (dar al-Islam) and the ‘abode of 
war’ (dar al-harb), and so on. Given their reliance on rival philosophical 
anthropologies and modes of acceding to truth, however, then it is equally 
implausible to imagine that the three European forms of ‘global justice’ can be 
reconciled among each other. It is thus reasonable to suggest that the main ways of 
measuring the European particularity of jus gentium against a global justice are 
themselves embedded in intellectual cultures that are not only regional to Europe but 
are also regional within Europe. 
We are thus raising the prospect that the postcolonial critique of a Eurocentric jus 
gentium is not only deeply enmeshed in European academic philosophy, but that the 
global philosophical history through which it seeks to localise jus gentium is itself 
local to those geointellectual regions in which European academic philosophy has 
been planted. In arguing that the philosophical-historical critique of jus gentium 
Eurocentrism is itself Eurocentric, our aim is not to engage in some kind of ‘meta-
critique’ — as if Eurocentrism could be determined in relation to some truly universal 
norm or history that this critique has yet to realise — but to head in a different 
direction altogether. Our concern rather is to acknowledge — indeed to insist on — 
the particularist or regional European character of jus gentium intellectual cultures, 
but to argue that this regionality is indefeasible on purely intellectual grounds; that is, 
on the grounds of a ‘global principle of justice’ and a ‘universal history’ of the kind 
presumed by its critical historiography, which turn out themselves to be regional to 
and within Europe. 
In fact there are compelling historical reasons for thinking that the regionality of 
European jus gentium ‘universalism’ became comprehensible and contestable not 
through rational philosophical reflection or universal history, but as a result of two 
highly contingent sets of historical developments taking place in the a-rational 
domain of cultural and political-military conflict. Firstly, the universalism of natural 
law and jus gentium was forcibly fractured from within Europe when, during the 
Christian ‘Reformation’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there emerged 
rival natural-law universalisms backed by warring religious and political orders.21 
                                                
21  See, Horst Dreitzel, ‘Naturrecht als politische Philosophie’, in H. Holzhey and W. 
Schmidt-Biggemann (eds.), Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, Band 4: Das heilige 
Römische Reich deutscher Nation, Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa (Basel: Schwabe, 2001), pp. 
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Second, the regional character of jus gentium universalism became intelligible when 
it was forcibly confronted from outside Europe, but only when non-European cultures 
possessed sufficient military and economic power to stop the European carriers of 
universalist religious and political cultures in their tracks; as in the case of the 
Chinese containment of the Jesuit mission during the sixteenth century.22 
From these momentous periods of cultural-political conflict emerged two 
intellectual genres or disciplinary traditions that make it possible to comprehend the 
particularistic character of European jus naturae et gentium without treating it as a 
derogation from a global normative order or universal history. The clash between 
rival armed metaphysical cultures during the European Reformation gave rise to a 
new kind of historiographic method, at the centre of which lay a strategy for 
suspending the truth-claims of the competing metaphysical systems by treating them 
all as historical ‘activities’ from the viewpoint of their impact on civil society.23 The 
resulting ‘histories of heresy’ and ‘narratives of civil government’ laid the 
groundwork for the modern method of contextual intellectual historiography, which is 
employed in the present paper as the means of grasping the regional character of jus 
gentium in terms of a series of contingent conflicts between the religious and political 
programs in which it was anchored. For its part, the building of linguistic and 
intellectual bridgeheads between otherwise discrepant European and New World 
                                                                                                                                      
836-48; T. J. Hochstrasser and Peter Schröder, (eds.), Early Modern Natural Law Theories: 
Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002); Knud 
Haakonssen, ‘German Natural Law’, in M. Goldie and R. Wokler (eds.), The Cambridge 
History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), pp. 251-90; and Ian Hunter and David Saunders, (eds.), Natural Law and Civil 
Sovereignty: Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political Thought 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).  
22  See, Qiong Zhang, “Cultural Accommodation or Intellectual Colonization? A 
Reinterpretation of the Jesuit Approach to Confucianism During the Late Sixteenth and Early 
Seventeenth Centuries”, (PhD, Harvard University, 1996); Qiong Zhang, ‘Translation as 
Cultural Reform: Jesuit Scholastic Psychology in the Transformation of the Confucian 
Discourse on Human Nature’, in J. W. O’Malley (SJ), et al. (eds.), The Jesuits: Cultures, 
Sciences, and the Arts 1540-1773 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1999), pp. 364-79.  
23  See, J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Gibbon and the History of Heresy’, in J. C. Laursen (ed.), 
Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe: For, Against, and Beyond Toleration 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 205-20; Ralph Häfner, ‘Jacob Thomasius und die 
Geschichte der Häresien’, in F. Vollhardt (ed.), Christian Thomasius (1655-1728): Neue 
Forschungen im Kontext der Frühaufklärung (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1997), pp. 141-64; 
and Ian Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State: The Political Thought of 
Christian Thomasius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 61-73.  
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cultures gave rise to the disciplines of ethnography and historical ethnology.24 These 
made it possible to grasp the regionality of European jus gentium from the viewpoint 
of rival civilisational cultures, some of them just as supremacist and imperialist as 
European religious and political cultures.25 From this comparative ethnological 
viewpoint the particularism of European jus gentium is understood not in terms of a 
global justice unfolding in a universal history, but in terms of more or less 
uncontrollable clashes between the emissaries of dispersed cultural-political 
archipelagoes. 
By drawing on these two approaches we can offer an historical discussion of the 
European regionality of jus gentium that does not measure this against a global justice 
and universal history, and hence does not treat this particularism as a symptom of 
moral error or as a source of political and juridical malfeasance. In so doing we call 
into question whether the cultural and political relations in which jus gentium 
discourses were enmeshed — not just the relations between European and non-
European peoples but also the relations between Europe’s warring moral communities 
— could have been brought within a single compass of intelligibility and moral or 
legal judgment, and hence whether they can be today. As a result, rather than a 
unifying principle of theoretical intelligibility — in which jus gentium discourses are 
forced to walk the single line between ideology and truth — what emerges is an 
historical account that disperses these discourses across a variety of contexts. Such 
were the contexts formed by the rival European intellectual cultures that jus gentium 
discourses embodied, and the clashing cultural and political programs for whose 
purposes they mobilised these cultures.  
                                                
24 See, Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: the American Indian and the Origins 
of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and John L. 
Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992). 
25  Cf., the perspective outlined in Onuma Yasuaki, ‘When was the Law of International 
Society Born? — An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilisational 
Perspective’, Journal of the History of International Law 2 (2000), 1-66, where at p. 7 we 
find the comment: ‘What is critical is the question of the scope of a society in which a certain 
normative system is valid and applied. Whether “ancient international law”, the Islamocentric 
siyar, the Sinocentric tribute system or Eurocentric law of nations, they are nothing other than 
regional normative systems which were applied in only a limited area of the earth and lasted 
for a limited period of time’. This is a salutory observation, although Onuma’s ‘inter-
civilisational’ perspective overunifies the different ‘civilisations’ and thus fails to take into 
account the plurality and rivalry of European jus gentium cultures. 
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II 
The European genre of jus naturae et gentium did not originate as the ideology 
of sixteenth-century colonialism and it did not lead to nineteenth-century imperialism. 
It neither sprang from the head of Franciso de Vitoria nor fell at the feet of Prince 
Leopold of the Congo. The law of nature and nations was not an ideology organised 
around a body of ideas — state sovereignty, the rule of law, agricultural and 
commercial society — that had emerged to do the repressive bidding of early modern 
colonial states, and would continue to play this role for their modern imperialist 
successors. Rather, it was a sprawling disciplinary clearing-house that had emerged 
during the thirteenth century, in order to provide an ordering matrix for Europe’s 
theological, juridical, and political cultures, and from which a bewildering variety of 
‘ideologies’ and ‘sciences’ (Wissenschaften) arose in particular historical contexts.26 
The ‘juridical’ legitimation of European religious and commercial intrusions into the 
New World was indeed one of the contextual uses to which this genre was put, as has 
been shown in an array of important studies.27 It needs to be carefully observed 
though that this use was not the unifying essence of jus gentium discourses, and that 
these intrusions could be and were justified on grounds — of Christian proselytising, 
dynastic ambition, military competition, economic wealth-creation — quite 
independent of the quasi-juridical ones offered by natural law and jus gentium. 
With this sense of the outer limits of jus naturae and gentium in place, we can 
turn to its radical internal diversity. Drawing on both Christian theology and the 
heritage of Roman law — and initially tied to the twin institutions of the Papacy and 
the Holy Roman German Empire — the first iterations of jus naturae et gentium were 
fundamentally theological-juridical.28 This theological inheritance remained 
signposted in the name ‘natural law’ itself, which refers to a law that is supposed to 
be natural in a two-fold sense: firstly, in being inscribed in and as man’s ‘rational and 
sociable nature’ by God; and secondly in being acceded to through man’s ‘natural’ 
reason, as opposed to through revelation or positive proclamation. Despite its 
                                                
26  See note ?? above.  
27  See, for examples, Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man; James Tully, ‘Placing the Two 
Treatises’, in N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (eds.), Political Discourse in Early Modern 
Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 253-82; Jörg Fisch, Die 
europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht: Die Auseinandersetzungen um den Status der 
überseeischen Gebiete vom 15. Jahundert bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1984); and 
Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000), pp. 141-62. 
28  Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 43-77. 
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Christian metaphysical basis, natural law was deemed to be universally accessible to 
all men on the basis of their shared rational and sociable nature, and thus to form the 
basis of a jus gentium or law of nations common to all ‘civilised’ peoples. 
Nonetheless, owing in part to the centripetal disciplines of theology, law and politics 
that it sought to harmonise, and in part to the variety of competing ways in which its 
key intellectual components were specified and assembled, jus naturae et gentium 
was not a single body of doctrine. It was rather a shifting intellectual matrix in which 
a variety of cross-cutting and finally mutually inimical theological, juridical and 
political doctrines could be formulated.29 
From the beginning, and with greater intensity with the onset of the 
‘Reformation’, the notion of a single universal natural law was mocked by the 
diversity of its conflicting constructions. These varied radically and fundamentally as 
a result of the incorporation of competing theological psychologies and philosophical 
anthropologies for human nature (as latently sociable, inherently fractious, rationally 
self-governing, irrationally passionate); conflicting conceptions of natural law (as 
man’s mode of acceding to divine law, or as a practical rule derived from self-
observation); rival ways of constructing civil authority (as grounded in an agreement 
to execute divine or natural right, versus a contract of mutual security); and 
conflicting ways of relating positive civil law to theological natural law (the former 
being sometimes treated as dependent on the latter and sometimes as its replacement). 
Rather than an ideological doctrine for European imperialism, the law of nature and 
nations supplied a gestational matrix for a wide variety of political philosophies,30 and 
for a diversity of reception-contexts for various kinds of positive law: Romano-canon 
law, regional common law, and imperial jus publicum (particularly as related to the 
religious peace treaties of 1555 and 1648).31 
                                                
29  For a helpful overview, see Michael Stolleis, ‘The Legitimation of Law through God, 
Tradition, Will, Nature and Constitution’, in L. Daston and M. Stolleis (eds.), Natural Law 
and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 45-56. Cf., Stolleis’s comment at p. 51 that ‘there is no such 
thing as “the” natural law; instead, in the course of some 150 years, the success of natural law 
was based on a wide variety of religious, theoretical and political approaches and motifs’. 
30  T. J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Dreitzel, ‘Naturrecht als politische Philosophie’; 
Hochstrasser and Schröder (eds), Early Modern Natural Law Theories. 
31 Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland. Erster Band: 
Reichspublizistik und Policeywissenschaft 1600-1800 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988), pp. 268-
97. 
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From among the diversity of forms of jus naturae et gentium that emerged in 
early modernity we can make brief mention of three broad types that are of particular 
significance for our present concerns. First, the high-point of confessional conflict 
during the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth century marked the dominance of 
scholastic theological constructions of natural law. Drawing on Christian-Aristotelian 
and Christian-Platonic sources, these constructions treated natural law as man’s 
‘natural’ mode of acceding to divine law, for which the theologians and clergy were 
the privileged interpreters. They were designed to provide a theocratic reception-
context for positive (Romano-canon) law in confessional states, and hence to justify 
the use of civil power for such religious ends as the prosecution of heretics and the 
conversion of infidels.32 Second, emerging in direct competition with this ‘Christian 
natural law’ was the post-scholastic or ‘secular’ natural law of the mid- to late-
seventeenth century, best exemplified in the work of Samuel Pufendorf. Symptomatic 
of a shift in natural law’s institutional centre of gravity from the theology to the law 
faculty, this secular construction derived natural law from the worldly end of social 
peace, and viewed the civil-law commands of the sovereign as the ultimate arbiter of 
how natural law is manifest in civil society and positive law.33 Finally, drawing on the 
rationalistic scholasticism of Christian Wolff — which continued to treat the nation as 
a self-perfecting corporate person — but combining this with an epitome of public-
law war- and peace-making, Vattel produced yet another version of the law of 
nations, this time conceived as a body of diplomatic rules for regulating the conduct 
of war and peace between equally ‘just’ European sovereigns.34 
Set against this dispersed array of contextually-specific constructions, the 
modern critical historiography of jus gentium begins to unravel. Just a few indicative 
observations will make the point. In the first place, in light of this variety, it becomes 
impossible to sustain the view that nineteenth-century imperialism found its 
ideological origins in Vitoria’s jus gentium — that is, as a means of imposing 
                                                
32  For Protestant scholastic natural law, see Hans-Peter Schneider, ‘Christliches 
Naturrecht’, in Holzhey and. Schmidt-Biggemann (eds.), Die Philosophie des 17. 
Jahrhunderts, Band 4, pp. 813-35. For Catholic see Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 
288-315. 
33  Notker Hammerstein, ‘Thomasius und die Rechtsgelehrsamkeit’, Studia Leibnitiana 
11 (1979), 22-44; Horst Dreitzel, ‘Samuel Pufendorf’, in Holzhey and Schmidt-Biggemann 
(eds.), Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, Band 4, pp. 757-812; and Hunter, Rival 
Enlightenments, ch. 4.  
34  Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, pp. 317-63.  
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European state sovereignty and law on non-European peoples.35 Rather than being a 
‘secular’ ideology intended to found an international order of states, Vitoria’s natural 
law and jus gentium belonged to the first, scholastic-theological form of natural law 
mentioned above. Under this dispensation natural law is embedded in divine law, and 
civil states are themselves embedded in the higher community of the universal 
(Catholic) church headed by Christ.36 Far from constructing a conception of secular 
sovereignty as a means of erasing the ‘cultural difference’ of the South American 
Indians, Vitoria’s central concern was to maintain the subordination of civil 
sovereignty to natural-law norms accessible only to the ‘wise clergy’ authorised by 
the apostolic succession. 
In De Indis this enabled Vitoria to maintain a Catholic theocratic construction of 
civil authority against the Protestant heretics who were threatening to make norms 
dependent on individual judgment and to treat the state as the product of a purely 
worldly covenant.37 It simultaneously enabled him to justify the use of this civil 
authority against the Indians should they attempt to resist their conversion to 
Christianity, whose legitimation is the central purpose of Vitoria’s jus gentium 
discourse.38 In imagining, though, that the European particularism of his jus gentium 
can be invalidated by a global right of all nations to self-determination, Vitoria’s 
modern critics should consider the fact that he appealed to the same right, based on 
the same ‘universal’ political metaphysics of globally self-realising nation-persons. 
By the same token, those seeking to defend Vitoria’s universalist conception of moral 
personhood — as a means of establishing the moral and juridical equality of 
European and New World peoples — should reflect on the fact that this depends upon 
the cultural conduct of different peoples being equalised through imposition of a 
uniform normative culture. In Vitoria’s case the normative model of personhood was 
invested in the Christian-Aristotelian anthropology of man’s ‘rational and sociable 
nature’, the attribution of which to the South American Indians allowed them to be 
                                                
35  Cf., Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, ch. 1; Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 1-31; 
Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law’. 
36  See, Franciso de Vitoria, ‘On Civil Power’ in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, 
(eds.), Franciso de Vitoria: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), pp. 1-44. See also, Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 290-301. 
37  Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, in Pagden and Lawrence (eds.), Political 
Writings, pp. 231-92, at pp. 233-38. 
38  Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, pp. 284-86. 
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considered moral equals of the Europeans, and thence to be ‘equalised’ through a 
coercive religious pedagogy that decimated their cultures.39 
Second, the notion that European imperialism found its initial justification in a 
jus gentium dedicated to construction of secular state sovereignty fares no better in 
relation to the second form of natural law mentioned above, which was indeed 
dedicated to such a construction. The most important early modern secular natural-
law construction of state sovereignty — Pufendorf’s De jure naturae et gentium of 
1672 — does not treat sovereignty as a moral universal or symptom of European 
civilisational progress that legitimates the subordination of the South Americans 
within a statist international law. In fact Pufendorf’s text was dedicated to destroying 
the notion that civil authority could be founded on any kind of universal morality, 
especially the kind of Christian-Aristotelian moral order championed by Vitoria and 
the scholastics.40 Against their political metaphysics, Pufendorf elaborated a secular 
Hobbesian conception of natural law — derived from the minimalist norm of 
maintaining civil peace — and thereby elevated the civil-law commands of the 
territorial sovereign into the sole effectual determinant of natural law.41 
Pufendorf’s reconstruction of the law of nature and nations was not driven by 
European colonial expansion into the New World, but by his intra-European 
campaign to displace the ‘universal’ political order of the Catholic church and the 
German Empire with a secular-territorial form of political authority. In prosecuting 
this campaign, however, Pufendorf also undermined the universalist Christian-
Aristotelian conception of a global ‘right of nations’ governing self-determining 
nation-persons, on which Vitoria’s global jus gentium was based. Pufendorf argued 
instead that if natural law is only rendered effective within the territorial jurisdictions 
of sovereign states, then there could be no positive law between nations.42 As a result, 
far from reinforcing Vitoria’s defence of Spain’s jus gentium rights to convert the 
South American Indians, Pufendorf pauses long enough from his intra-European 
                                                
39  See Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, pp. 92-6. 
40  Michael J. Seidler, ‘Pufendorf and the Politics of Recognition’, in Hunter and 
Saunders (eds.), Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty, pp. 235-51.  
41  For more, see Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, pp. 148-96; Fiammetta Palladini, 
‘Pufendorf disciple of Hobbes: The nature of man and the state of nature: The doctrine of 
socialitas’, History of European Ideas 34 (2008), 26-60; and Horst Dreitzel, ‘The Reception 
of Hobbes in the Political Philosophy of the Early German Enlightenment’, History of 
European Ideas 29 (2003), 255-89.  
42  Samuel Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and of Nations in Eight Books, trans. C. H. 
Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), (II.iii.23, pp. 226-29).  
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concerns to refute Vitoria’s case. If justice is internal to the political order of the 
territorial state, then there are no positive international rights, such as the rights to 
hospitality, trade, and proselytising defended by Vitoria; and the question of whether 
the Spanish can engage in the relevant activities should be wholly at the disposition of 
the South American peoples themselves.43 
Finally, similar remarks apply to claims that eighteenth-century public-law jus 
gentium — especially that of Emer de Vattel — also originated in the ideological 
imperative to impose European conceptions of sovereignty, agriculture and commerce 
on New World peoples. Against Pufendorf’s territorialist construction, Vattel’s Droit 
des gens of 1758 was dedicated to (partially) reinstating a trans-territorial law of 
nations. To this end Vattel resurrected the universalist natural-law metaphysics of 
self-realising nation-persons, as mediated via Wolff’s rationalist version.44 Turning 
decisively against the scholastic theology of a universal ecclesial community, 
however, Vattel treated each nation as morally autonomous, embedding the law of 
nations instead in the customs and conventions of European public-law war- and 
peace-making.45 That this supposedly universal law of nations was regional to Europe 
is undoubtedly the case, as we can see from the fact that it rested intellectually on a 
neo-scholastic moral anthropology, and politically on a European ‘balance of powers’ 
as the condition of enforcing its regulatory conventions.46 This does not mean, 
though, that it can be understood as failing to realise a truly universal international 
justice, as if Vattel’s intra-European conception of an order of self-perfecting 
agricultural and commercial national states were fundamentally a supremacist means 
of constituting the barbarism and savagery of New World peoples. In fact, Vattel’s 
central objective in constructing a public law of nations was not to justify New World 
colonisation but to consolidate the civilising effect of the intra-European regulation of 
warfare. This civilising effect, Vattel argued, flowed from the gradual transformation 
of unbridled wars of religion and booty into restricted wars conducted in a ‘regular 
                                                
43  Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, (III.iii.9, pp. 363-66). 
44  For the neo-scholastic dimension of Vattel’s construction of self-perfection nation-
persons, including his criticisms of Pufendorf’s natural law, see Emer de Vattel, ‘Essay on the 
Foundation of Natural Law and on the First Principle of the Obligation Men Find Themselves 
Under to Observe Laws’, in B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore (eds.), The Law of Nations 
(Indianapolis Liberty Fund, 2008), pp. 747-72.  
45  Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to 
the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, ed. B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), pp. 74-79. 
46  Vattel, Law of Nations, pp. 496-97. 
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form’ between equally ‘just sovereigns’.47 As a result, despite the evident 
Eurocentrism of his thinking and program — or perhaps because of it — Vattel 
located barbarism and savagery not in New World peoples but in an array of peoples 
who had engaged in unregulated atrocious warfare: the European religious zealots of 
the recent wars of religion, the ancient booty-seeking Germans and Goths, sundry 
bandit groups, and the ‘Tartar’ pirates.48 
Similarly, remarks apply to the one place where Vattel does argue for the 
impairment of New World rights: in his passing comments on curtailing the property 
rights of non-agricultural nomadic peoples.49 This position was not symptomatic of 
Vattel’s derogation from — hence his implicit possession of — a truly universal 
conception of justice: as if he might have recognised these rights had he not allowed 
his reason to be rendered particularistic by the material interests of colonialism. On 
the contrary, this position was the result of Vattel’s entirely explicit moral-republican 
argument that political rights are grounded in the cultivation of civic virtues — 
including agricultural, commercial and military virtues — in a national ‘country’.50 
Without denying in the slightest that this argument was regional to Europe and within 
it, there is no reason to think that in applying it to New World peoples Vattel was 
allowing a latently universalist jus gentium to be distorted by colonialist interests. 
This is not least because Vattel also applied the same argument to diminish the rights 
of certain European groups: namely, those of the (Catholic) religious orders who also 
refused to cultivate the agricultural, commercial and military virtues required for the 
perfection of the moral republic.51 
There are thus comprehensive reasons for questioning the entire critical 
historiographic approach to early modern jus gentium, in both its ‘con’ and ‘pro’ 
forms. There is no evidence to suggest that jus gentium originated as the colonialist 
imposition of a European ideology of secular sovereignty. Neither is there any reason 
to think that its various regional or contextual forms could or should have realised a 
universal form of international justice to which ‘we’ (critical moderns) imagine 
ourselves having acceded. The conception of state sovereignty that critical 
historiography makes central to its account of the ideological origins of European 
                                                
47  Vattel, Law of Nations, pp. 507-8, 644-47. 
48  Vattel, Law of Nations, pp. 129, 487, 507-8. 
49  Vattel, Law of Nations, pp. 130, 214-16. 
50  Vattel, Law of Nations, pp. 128-31, 131-39, 198-203. 
51  Vattel, Law of Nations, pp. 174-80, 474-75. 
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imperialism — that is, the conception that identifies sovereignty with the progress of 
European civilisation in order to police the admittance of uncivilised peoples to the 
‘community of states’ — is not present in early modern jus gentium. There are now 
compelling reasons for thinking that this conception only emerged with the 
appearance of modern international law in the mid-nineteenth century. 
That, I take it, is one of the central lessons of Martti Koskenniemi’s remarkable 
study of the rise and fall of modern international law.52 According to Koskenniemi, 
modern international law did not emerge from ideological origins supplied by early 
modern jus gentium, but represented a double displacement of earlier forms and 
contexts. On the one hand, the intellectual architecture of modern international law 
was not continuous with the theological, juridical and political cultures that flowed 
into jus gentium. Rather, it incorporated an array of modern philosophical and social-
theoretic intellectual cultures — Kantian, Hegelian, later Durkheimian — that made it 
possible to treat state sovereignty as both grounded in universal reason and unfolding 
sociologically in a globalising universal history.53 On the other hand, this rational 
universalism of the ‘liberal humanitarian’ international jurists was symptomatic not of 
the triumph of the public-law order of European territorial states but in fact of its 
eclipse.54 In fact it was symptomatic of the transformation of European colonialism 
into imperial rule and, more importantly, of the emergence of a series of extra-
European ‘Grossraumordnungen’ — great spatial hegemonies — beginning with the 
most durable: the Western-hemispheric hegemony of the USA.55 It is this late-
nineteenth-century use of state sovereignty as an instrument of trans-territorial 
imperial hegemony that critical historiography anachronistically projects backwards 
onto early modern jus gentium. 
                                                
52  Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
53  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 179-209, 274-302. 
54  Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, pp. 413-22. 
55  The term is Carl Schmitt’s, on whose account of the rise of a post-European world 
order Koskenniemi relies for this point. See, Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche 
Großraumordnung, mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte: Ein Beitrag zum 
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III 
As a result of its dependence on post-Kantian conceptions of theory and 
universal history, the critical historiography of jus gentium and international law 
assumes the form of a philosophical hermeneutics. We have already observed that this 
historiography uses the theory-practice dichotomy to divide jus gentium into an 
ideological form — characterised by the particularistic ‘complicity’ of its ideas with 
the material interests of colonialism — and a (potentially) true form, whose ideas 
comprehend global justice, or will be globalised by a universal history. This is the 
hermeneutic grid that critical historiography imposes on the sprawling and variegated 
contextual history of jus naturae et gentium. Under this grid, any given jus gentium 
text or discourse can be interpreted by purporting to discern the degree of 
particularism (ideology) or universality (truth) of its ideas — of moral personality, 
political authority, justice, and so on. This is in turn is treated as symptomatic of the 
discourse’s relative place in a progressive universal history leading to the universal 
conception of justice from which the critical interpreter looks back on the 
particularistic ignorance or universalistic prescience of his intellectual ancestors.  
In practice, this philosophical-hermeneutic method routinely produces quite 
contradictory interpretations of any given jus gentium discourse or author. We have 
already observed that Vitoria is attacked by some modern commentators for foisting 
Eurocentric ideas of state sovereignty and law on the South American Indians,56 while 
being defended by others for bringing the Indians within a truly universal conception 
of human personhood.57 Similarly, Christian Wolff’s jus gentium has been criticised 
by some for establishing a Eurocentric moral hierarchy of nations stretching from the 
least to the most rational,58 yet praised by others for denying particularistic European 
rights and treating all peoples as equally capable of national self-determination.59 For 
his part, Kant has been occasionally criticised for imposing a Eurocentric 
                                                
56  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, ch. 1; Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 1-31; 
Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law’; Williams, The American Indian, p. 
107. 
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universalism on colonised peoples,60 while being much more frequently extolled as 
the source of a truly universal conception of international justice, in the form of his 
principle of ‘cosmopolitan right’.61 Those familiar with the literature will have 
encountered the same kind of polar reversals in readings ranging across Pufendorf 
and Vattel to James and John Stuart Mill. 
Approached on their own methodological grounds — that is, from the viewpoint 
of philosophical-historical hermeneutics — there is nothing to choose between these 
rival interpretations. Given the hermeneutic grid, it is always possible to interpret jus 
gentium ideas as symptomatic either of Eurocentric self-interest or of universal 
justice, and thence to measure their historical distance from the ‘promise’ of a true 
idea of international justice bestowed on the interpreter. In this way, the hermeneutic 
approach establishes a relation of reciprocal dependency between the ideological or 
true character of ideas (on the one hand) and their historical effectivity (on the other). 
Some ideas — state sovereignty, the rule of law — are interpreted as Eurocentric by 
positing a complicity with colonialism that is supposed to be symptomatic of their 
derogation from universal justice, which means that these ideas must have been 
effectually complicit with colonialism because they were indeed Eurocentric. 
Similarly, other ideas — man’s ‘rational and sociable being’, the ‘cosmopolitan 
principle of right’ — are interpreted as universal by positing a process of historical 
development that is bringing them to global fruition, which means that such a process 
of globalisation must be effectually taking place as these ideas are indeed universal. 
This means that some jus gentium writers — Wolff, for example — can be treated 
either as architects of colonial repression or as harbingers of international justice 
without any investigation of whether their texts were actually received and effectually 
used in the relevant political and juridical institutions which, in Wolff’s case, looks 
quite unlikely.62 Similarly if another writer’s texts were used in relevant institutions 
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— as in the case of Vattel — then it is too often assumed that we can read-off their 
historical effects (as repressive or emancipatory) from the texts themselves, without 
investigating how they were received and used in particular historical contexts. 
In order to break free of this philosophical-hermeneutic stranglehold on the 
history of jus gentium it is necessary to move in two directions simultaneously. First, 
if we are to understand the significance of natural law and jus gentium discourses in 
particular contexts then it is necessary to bracket the supposed truth or falsity of their 
ideas and focus instead on what these discourses were ‘doing’, particularly on their 
role in forming the persona of the natural-law jurist, understood as a particular way of 
acceding to the truth of religious, political and juridical ideas. Second, if we are to 
understand how these discourses were received and used in particular contexts — 
including colonial contexts — then we must jettison the idea that this took place via a 
dialectics of ideas and material determinations, governed by the logic of repression 
and emancipation. Instead, we must investigate the particular religious, juridical and 
political programs for whose purposes jus gentium discourses were fashioned, and in 
whose conflicts they were enmeshed, treating the history of jus gentium and 
international law as in effect the history of these conflicts. 
On the first side of the equation, the hermeneutic dialectic of ideas and material 
determinations is undermined by the eminently material and historical character of the 
intellectual components of the law of nature and nations themselves. If we examine 
these components — the moral theologies or philosophical anthropologies, the 
metaphysical and anti-metaphysical conceptions of natural law, the speculative 
histories of property or sovereignty, and so on — then what we encounter are not true 
or false ideas as such. Rather, we are confronted by a diverse array of intellectual 
practices or cultures through whose formative effects ideas or beliefs are acceded to 
in particular ways, ‘offices’ or personae. Koskenneimi has thus argued that to 
understand modern international law it is not the doctrinal ideas of the jurists that 
matters but their shared ‘sensibility’, formed on the basis of a broad philosophical and 
moral culture.63 In a similar vein, a research collaboration in which I have participated 
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has argued that the history of philosophy should take as its focus not the philosophical 
subject of truth or ideology but the ‘persona’ of the philosopher.64 This is the purpose-
built ‘self’, formed through the mastery of an array of intellectual, moral and 
technical ‘arts of the self’, on the basis of which particular ways of acceding to truth 
are instituted.65 
The history of the natural law and jus gentium is thus not grounded in a 
philosophical subject rendered myopic by Eurocentric interests or panoptic by a 
‘universal history with cosmopolitan intent’. Neither is it centred in a European ‘self’ 
closed in on itself by its occlusion of a non-European ‘other’, whose protean being 
promises an emancipatory postcolonial renovation of politics. Rather, the concepts 
and doctrines of jus gentium were thought through the cultivation of a variety of 
theological-, philosophical-, and political-juristic personae. These can be envisaged as 
emerging in the space between two axes: first, that formed by particular means of 
ethical self-shaping, including theological and moral anthropologies of various kinds, 
and the recovered ethoi of scepticism, neo-Stoicism, neo-Aristotelianism, neo-
Platonism and neo-Epicureanism;66 and, second, the axis formed by a variety of 
professional roles or ‘offices’, including political theologian for one of the rival 
churches; political or diplomatic adviser to the prince; common-law or public-law 
jurisconsult to a state or estate; academic philosopher in a ‘republic of letters’; and so 
on.67 
                                                
64  Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Ian Hunter, (eds.), The Philosopher in Early 
Modern Europe: The Nature of a Contested Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). On the constitution of a particular form of the juristic persona — that of the 
early modern English common lawyer — see David Saunders, ‘The Judicial Persona in 
Historical Context: The Case of Matthew Hale’, in Condren, Gaukroger, and Hunter (eds.), 
The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe, pp. 140-59. For the role of anti-scholastic natural 
law in secularising the persona of early modern ‘territorial’ jurists, see Hunter, The 
Secularisation of the Confessional State, pp. 51-83, 86-108. 
65  Ian Hunter, ‘The History of Philosophy and the Persona of the Philosopher’, Modern 
Intellectual History 4 (2007), 571-600. Cf., also Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982, ed. F. Gros, trans. G. Burchell (New 
York: Picador, 2006), pp. 1-24. 
66  Cf., the discussion of ethical self-cultivation in Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 
trans. R. Hurley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985); and Foucault, The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject. 
67  On the execution of political thought and action through formal and informal 
‘offices’, see Conal Condren, ‘The Problem of Audience, Office and the Language of 
Political Action in Lawson’s Politica and Hobbes’s Leviathan’, Zeitschrift für Historische 
Forschung 26 (2001), 287-303; and Conal Condren, Argument and Authority in Early 
Modern England: The Presupposition of Oaths and Offices (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
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With regard to what is being ‘done’ with the discourses of jus naturae et 
gentium, and their role in forming particular ways of acceding to truth and justice, we 
should pay particular attention to the formative uses of the philosophical 
anthropologies and cosmologies that they contain. In Vitoria’s case, for example, the 
Thomist-Aristotelian anthropology of man’s ‘rational and sociable nature’ — where 
reason is both the developmental law inscribed by God in man’s nature, and the 
means by which man becomes conscious of this law through an exercise that touches 
God’s rational nature (‘synderesis’) — permits Vitoria to claim a privileged role for 
the cadre of Catholic theologians. As learned body whose cultivation of reason 
permits them to accede to the objective moral laws inscribed in man’s nature by God, 
the theologians claimed the role of steering the exercise of civil authority in 
accordance with these laws.68 This included its exercise to discipline the Indians 
should the latter resist the proselytising intended to realise the laws embedded in the 
universal nature that they shared with their Spanish colonisers. Vitoria’s jus gentium 
is thus acceded to in the persona and office of the learned and holy theologian whose 
privileged access to the divine laws inscribed in man’s universal moral nature 
legitimates his prescription of these laws to the civil authorities and their deployment 
as a coercive religious pedagogy. 
In combining the Aristotelian anthropology of man’s ‘rational and sociable 
nature’ with an epitome of the public-law regulation of European war- and peace-
making, however, Vattel’s jus gentium accedes to the ‘law of nations’ in a quite 
different way and for quite different ends. We have seen that Vattel unfolded his law 
of nations between two distinct ethical registers: that of a universal justice based on 
the natural-law imperative of mankind’s corporate self-perfection; and that of a 
‘voluntary law of nations’ in which each nation-person makes its own national 
interest into the arbiter of what is ‘just’. In doing so Vattel acceded to the law of 
nations in the persona of the casuist-diplomat, whose role is to use the historical 
conventions of European war- and peace-making as the means of adjusting universal 
justice to the circumstances of national prudence and self-interest. Vattel’s was thus a 
jus gentium for diplomats and statesmen involved in European treaty-making. It was 
precisely this use that led Kant to include Vattel — together with Grotius and 
                                                
68  Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, pp. 234-38. 
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Pufendorf — among his ‘sorry comforters’ of the law of nations.69 But this was only 
because in envisaging his own cosmopolitan jus gentium as the product of the 
harmonised wills of a universe of rational beings, Kant saw himself acceding to the 
principle of justice in a different kind of persona: that of the philosopher who 
channeled this rational general will into the world of empirical law and politics. 
Kant’s claim to have superseded his ‘merely empirical’ predecessors by 
recovering a universal theory of justice is thus undermined by the fact that it relies on 
the ‘arbitrary’ or historical privileging of a particular discursive ‘ritual’ for acceding 
to justice: as ‘universal theory’. More generally, the rival intellectual cultures 
informing the history of jus gentium cannot be distributed along a single universal 
philosophical-historical path leading from the ideological (particularistic) to the true 
(universal), as each represents a particularistic means of acceding to ‘universal truth’. 
The intellectual history of jus gentium is thus a history of unfinished contestation 
between rival intellectual cultures. Today Catholic apologists thus continue to 
champion Vitoria’s mode of acceding to truth — through theological insight into the 
law of man’s ‘rational and sociable nature’ — while other (de facto Protestant) 
philosophers extol Kant’s channeling of the rational common will as the only way to 
accede to universal justice.70 
IV 
On the other side of dialectical equation, the historical effects of various jus 
gentium discourses cannot be read-off from the particularistic character of their 
constituent ideas: as if this were a sign of their ‘complicity’ with material interests 
that are in turn advanced by the particularistic or Eurocentric character of these ideas. 
We have argued to the contrary that all jus gentium discourses have been irretrievably 
particularistic — in the sense of regional to and within Europe — as a result of the 
rival intellectual cultures within which they were elaborated and the conflicting 
religious, juridical and political programs for which they were elaborated. What 
historical effects might or might not have arisen at the nexus of various jus gentium 
discourses and particular religious, juridical and political programs is thus not 
                                                
69  Immanuel Kant, ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’, in M. J. Gregor (ed.), Practical 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 311-52, at 326-27.  
70  In this regard, compare the defence of Vitoria in Tierney’s Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 
255-72, 290-301, with the defence and reconstruction of Kant in Rawls’s Law of Peoples and 
Habermas’s ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace’. 
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something that can be read-off from the putative signs of their ideological 
particularism or, conversely, their rational universalism. Rather, this is something that 
can only be determined through historical investigation of how such discourses were 
received and used within contexts defined by the relations between concrete cultural 
and political forces. It is the contingent and often unfinished interactions between 
these forces that constitutes the inherently unstable ‘present’ from which the history 
of jus gentium must be written. 
In order to provide some sense of the use of jus gentium discourses within an 
appropriately concrete colonial context, I will draw on a body of recent investigations 
into the uses of English law in colonial New Zealand and Australia.71 Despite their 
differences in focus and emphasis, in investigating the ideological role of legal 
discourses in particular colonial contexts these studies implicitly refuse to organise 
their discussions around the dyads of the ideal and the actual, ideas and their material 
determinations. Their common tendency, rather, is to treat such discourses themselves 
as concrete activities — cultivations of particular kinds of juridical intelligibility and 
personae — that were capable of combining (or not) with other activities (discursive 
and non-discursive), in processes responsible for the formulation and execution of 
particular kinds of colonial programs. These studies thus do not treat jus gentium 
concepts of sovereignty and property as ideological occlusions of true forms that were 
supposedly already possessed by colonised peoples in the form of indigenous 
sovereignty and native title.72 Rather, they treat these concepts as performatives 
                                                
71  See in particular the remarkable essays collected in Andrew Sharp and P. G. 
McHugh, (eds.), Histories, Power and Loss: Uses of the Past — a New Zealand Commentary 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2001). See also Mark Hickford, ‘“Decidedly the Most 
Interesting Savages on the Globe”: An Approach to the Intellectual History of Maori Property 
Rights, 1837-53’, History of Political Thought 27 (2006), 122-67; Mark Hickford, ‘John 
Salmond and Native Title in New Zealand: Developing a Crown Theory on the Treaty of 
Waitangi, 1910-1920’, Victoria University Law Review?? (2007), ??; P. G. McHugh, 
Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-
Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); J. G. A. Pocock, The Discovery of 
Islands: Essays in British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Damen 
Ward, ‘A Means and Measure of Civilisation: Colonial Authorities and Indigenous Law in 
Australasia’, History Compass 1 (2003), 1-23; and Damen Ward, ‘Constructing British 
Authority in Australasia: Charles Cooper and the Legal Status of Aborigines in the South 
Australian Supreme Court, c. 1840-60’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
34 (2006), 483-504. See too the papers by Dorsett, Hickford, Sharp and Ward in this volume. 
72  For the contrary view that Australian Aboriginal forms of authority and land-relation 
were immediately conceivable via European juridical conceptions of sovereignty and 
property, and were then wilfully obscured in order to achieve dispossession, see the 
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involved in historical struggles over the ordering of political and juridical authority, 
which means that the ascription (or denial) of sovereignty and property is always the 
contingent outcome of some contested historical ordering or settlement, whether this 
be the Anglican Settlement of 1688 or the Waitangi Treaty of 1840.73 
This points towards a significant revision of the ‘critical’ historical 
understanding of the English armed expeditionary intrusions into, and subsequent 
colonisations of New Zealand and Australia. In the picture that emerges, colonising 
acts were not rendered effectual through false (hence potentially true) concepts — 
whether of sovereignty and property, or of discovery, conquest, cession, terra nullius 
— contained in European jus gentium. Rather, these acts were the outcome of the 
concrete play of cultural and political forces in which the circulation of jus gentium 
discourses provided instrumental forms of juridical and political intelligibility for 
colonising programs whose accomplishment depended neither on the falsity nor truth 
of these discourses. As a result, these colonising acts and programs cannot be 
understood today as if they were effected through the ideological distortion of truly 
universal principles of justice that could have included the European intruders and the 
indigenous inhabitants within a single global normative order.74 Several observations 
are required to clarify the character of this changed approach to the colonialist use of 
jus gentium discourses in the New Zealand and Australian contexts. 
First, at the most general level, it is important not to overestimate the 
significance and effects of jus gentium discourses — and indeed of positive legal 
discourses — as if their (false) ideas of sovereignty and property actually motivated 
                                                                                                                                      
discussions of indigenous sovereignty and land ownership in Reynolds, The Law of the Land, 
and Aboriginal Sovereignty. 
73  For important statements and exemplifications of this position, see P. G. McHugh, 
‘The Common-Law Status of Colonies and Aboriginal “Rights”: How Lawyers and 
Historians Treat the Past’, Saskatchewan Law Review 61 (1998), 393-42; Hickford, 
‘Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages’; Hickford, ‘John Salmond and Native Title in New 
Zealand’; Ward, ‘A Means and Measure of Civilisation’; and Ward, ‘Constructing British 
Authority in Australasia’. 
74  For illuminating discussions of this issue, see Andrew Sharp, ‘History and 
Sovereignty: A Case of Juridical History in New Zealand/Aotearoa’, in M. Peters (ed.), 
Cultural Politics and the University in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press, 1997), pp. 159-81; Richard P. Boast, ‘Lawyers, Historians, Ethics and the Judicial 
Process’, Victoria University Law Review 28 (1998), 87-112; and W. H. Oliver, ‘The Future 
Behind Us: The Waitangi Tribunal’s Retrospective Utopia’, in Sharp and McHugh (eds.), 
Histories, Power and Loss, pp. 9-30. 
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the colonising acts of intruding soldiers, traders and missionaries.75 It looks much 
more likely that these acts were driven by a diversity of sometimes-conflicting logics 
and interests, including rival inter-state military expansionism; public policy 
initiatives (the penal colony of New South Wales); private economic undertakings 
(the New Zealand Company and the South Australian Company); and Christian 
proselytising (the [Anglican] Church Missionary Society and the Wesleyan 
Missionary Society). If jus gentium discourses were present in some of these 
colonising projects — for example, supplying concepts of discovery, conquest and 
cession to military ‘voyages of discovery’ — then they were absent in others. 
Christian missionary enterprises thus had no need of such quasi-juridical justification, 
being driven instead by evangelisation, proselytising, and the logic of ‘saving souls’, 
and sometimes expressing hostility towards secular law and jus gentium.76 Similarly, 
if Eurocentric civilisational supremacy informed some of these agendas, then so too 
did Christian universalist conceptions of human equality; even if the latter turned out 
to be no less Eurocentric than the former, and equally toxic for non-Christian 
cultures.77 Colonialist programs emerged from these cross-cutting ‘logics’ not in the 
form of a transition from jus gentium theory to colonial practice, but in the course of a 
ramifying series of contingent conflicts, compromises and circumstantial policies, in 
which jus gentium concepts were defined by their shifting deployments. 
Second, if jus gentium concepts obtained their significance through the ways in 
which they were put to work in particular colonial programs, then only those jus 
gentium discourses that lent themselves to such uses became effective in New 
Zealand and Australia. Our earlier comments on the historical unimportance of 
                                                
75  For a statement of the contrary view — in which European law is the ‘theory’ for 
colonialist ‘practice’ — see James Thuo Gathii, ‘International Law and Eurocenctricity’, 
European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), 184-211. For the sceptical alternative, see 
McHugh, ‘The Common-Law Status of Colonies’.  
76  Consider the comment in the journal of the Aborigine’s Protection Society — The 
Colonial Intelligencer or Aborigines’ Friend — of 1847, that ‘the important point to 
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‘Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages, p. 162. 
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and political ideologies in order to hide this fact. See Reynolds, The Law of the Land, ch. iv. 
Despite his acknowledgment that this recognition was premised on the imposition of a 
universalist Christian metaphysical anthropology — parallel to the one we have discussed 
with regard to Vitoria — Reynolds fails to note that this meant that such recognition was 
internal to a program of conversion and religious pedagogy corrosive of Aboriginal 
cosmogonies and their associated cultural practices.  
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Wolff’s and Kant’s jus gentium thus find further confirmation in this case, as they do 
not appear to have been cited as legal authorities or used as political philosophers in 
colonial New Zealand or Australia. Conversely, the significant use of Vattel in this 
context is almost certainly a result of the fact that — unlike Wolff’s and Kant’s — his 
jus gentium had combined natural-law political philosophy with an historical 
conspectus of the treaty-based conventions governing war, peace, commerce and 
communications between European states. This made it useable as a source of quasi-
juridical norms in a variety of positive legal and political circumstances, from 
European diplomacy and public law, to colonial juridical and political constructions 
of a law ‘inter gentes’. 
The version of Vattel’s Law of Nations that found his way into New Zealand 
(and to a lesser extent) Australian colonial contexts, however, was one that had been 
significantly transformed by the assimilation into English juridical and political 
culture that it had undergone in Joseph Chitty’s edition of 1834, which was the 
edition used by British colonial officials and jurists.78 By suspending Vattel’s text in 
dense mesh of comments, authorities, and case-law citations — presumably reflecting 
Chitty’s earlier teaching at the London Inns of Court — Chitty’s edition adapted 
Vattel’s jus gentium to British constitutional thought and English common-law 
culture. Chitty’s notes thus ignore Vattel’s republican political metaphysics, 
recommending that readers instead consult ‘Locke on Government’ and De Lolme’s 
anti-republican Constitution of England; the latter’s endorsement of England’s 
constitutional division of powers — monarchical executive, parliamentary legislature, 
and common-law judiciary — being far removed from Vattel’s metaphysics of self-
perfecting corporate nation-persons.79 As a result, Chitty’s notes are focused almost 
entirely on Vattel’s ‘voluntary law of nations’; that is, on the latter’s account of the 
customs and conventions embodied in European treaties concerned with war and 
peace, particularly those regulating maritime commerce with respect to such issues as 
neutrality, immunity, contraband, confiscation, and reparations. Here, though, Chitty 
transformed Vattel’s discussions of these issues by tying them to a web of case-law 
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79  Chitty in Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations: or Principles of the Law of Nature 
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citations taken from the Courts of Admiralty and the Kings Bench, most of them 
dealing with the maintenance and regulation of maritime commerce during the 
American revolutionary war and the Napoleonic wars.80 
Chitty’s assimilation of Vattel to British politics and English law produced a jus 
gentium that was suited to use in British colonial contexts. On the one hand, Chitty’s 
Vattel transmitted the supra-municipal vocabulary of the law of nations — dealing 
with nation, sovereignty, treaty, occupation, property — thereby activating the long-
standing use of jus gentium as a reception matrix for positive law in a conquered or 
ceded territory. On the other hand, by sidelining Vattel’s political metaphysics and 
tying his European treaty-based state relations to English case-law, Chitty reoriented 
Vattel’s jus gentium towards English domestic or municipal law. Chitty’s Vattel was 
thus not so much a source of ideological justifications for the exercise of British 
sovereignty over colonial territories — Chitty treated this as a ‘political’ fact beyond 
the reach of municipal law81 — and was more a means for receiving English law in 
colonial territories whose British sovereignty was treated as a military-political 
presupposition of legal order. 
Third we are now in a position to observe that the historical significance and 
effects of jus gentium concepts of sovereignty and property in colonial contexts were 
determined not by their falsity or truth, but by their contested use to shape particular 
orderings of political and legal authority. Mark Hickford has thus argued that Chitty’s 
Vattel, operating in tandem with a Scottish stadial theory of civilisational 
development, provided a vocabulary through which the British Colonial Office and 
the New Zealand Company could formulate Maori land-holding as a form of ‘native 
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81  Cf., Chitty’s comments that: ‘Questions respecting the construction, infraction, or 
observance of treaties, are not in general directly agitated in any municipal court of law or 
equity of Great Britain. … Political treaties between a foreign state and subejcts of the crown 
of Great Britain, acting as an Independent state under the powers granted by charter and act of 
parliament, are not a subject of municipal jurisdiction’. Chitty in Vattel, Law of Nations, p. 
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title’.82 Through this hybrid vocabulary, Maori could be ascribed a form of title based 
on ‘occupation’, understood as grounded in their form of life as ‘primitive 
agriculturalists’ practising horticulture on small village land-holdings. This allowed 
Maori land-holding to be treated as a form of English common-law title, thus 
alienable to the New Zealand Company. At the same time, it allowed all ‘unoccupied’ 
land to be treated as unowned, hence as belonging to the Crown via the doctrine of 
‘eminent domain’ (fundamental title) through the acquisition of sovereignty that 
would be formalised with the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. 
This set the scene for an intense struggle between the representatives of the New 
Zealand Company — who used stadial theory and jus gentium to pre-emptively 
declare most of New Zealand to be land that the Crown could grant to its settlers — 
and representatives of the Colonial Office, particularly the Permanent Under-
Secretary James Stephen, who sought to investigate the form and extent of Maori 
land-holding and to restrict the Company’s acquisition of Crown land through 
appropriate purchase fees.83 As it turned out, events swung in favour of the 
Company’s position not through the ideological force of stadial theory and Vattelian 
jus gentium, but as a result of a political transformation in the British administration: 
the appointments of Viscount Howick (Earl Grey) to head the Colonial Office (1846) 
and George Grey as governor of New Zealand (1845), both notable supporters of the 
New Zealand Company. It was this political change that provided the ideology with 
the political force that allowed it to shape George Grey’s land distribution policy: the 
policy of extensive government land purchases as a means of extinguishing broad 
native title and reconstructing this title in terms of the reserved proprietorship of 
limited horticultural holdings84 As Hickford comments: ‘What was at stake was not 
merely control of the rationale for policy but the manner in which it would be 
executed in practice irrespective of legal niceties. In essence, the question of defining 
public policy (and the history of its practice) had much to do with power and 
authority over those processes that beget desired outcomes in the first place’.85 
Finally, we can observe that even if — perhaps especially if — the colonial 
effectivity of jus gentium concepts of sovereignty and property hinged upon their 
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84  Hickford, ‘Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages’, pp. 160-65. 
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deployment within contested programs for the shaping of a political and juridical 
order, it is anachronistic to imagine that this order was based on the ideological 
character of these ideas; that is, on their function of occluding a global form of 
justice, based in true conceptions of sovereignty and property, shared by the British 
and Maori cultures. In contrast to the case of the Australian Aborigines, 
acknowledgment of Maori capacities for agriculture, commerce and organised 
warfare had indeed led to a recognition of their sovereignty — hence their capacity to 
enter into the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 — if only for the purposes of ceding this 
sovereignty to the British Crown. As John Pocock has argued, however, despite the 
Treaty’s bi-lingual formulation, there was no way for its jus gentium concepts of 
sovereignty and property to achieve the cultural translation of the Maori idea of 
‘belonging to the land’. The latter was not based in the European juridical culture of 
transferable rights that was in the process of defining native title. Rather it was 
grounded in such cultural practices as burying the placenta of new-borns in the land 
to which they will belong — the word whenua meaning both ‘land’ and ‘placenta’ — 
such that land-holding is understood in terms of belonging to the community of 
ancestors that is personified by the land’s present occupants.86 This kind of 
knowledge was incompatible with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European 
philosophical anthropology — welded as it was to rights as subjective capacities of 
‘rational and sociable’ individuals — and would only become available via twentieth 
century ethnology and ethno-linguists: disciplines which were themselves the 
contingent outcome of reflection taking place within the cultural bridgeheads formed 
through colonisation.87 
If we place the radically ethnocentric Maori conception of land-belonging 
alongside the radically Eurocentric conceptions of sovereignty and property found in 
jus gentium — recalling, for example, Vattel’s entirely metaphysical conception of 
sovereignty as the political authority exercised by and for a self-perfecting nation-
person — then there is no reason to think that the clash between the British and the 
Maori could have been rendered morally intelligible within a common normative 
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juridical order.88 We have already seen that the candidates for such an order to which 
critical historiography appeals today — the ‘universal justice’ of free national self-
determination, Kantian cosmopolitan right, or the equalising dissolution of the 
colonising ‘self’ and its ‘other’ — are themselves neither more nor less than the 
instruments of rival European metaphysical cultures, hence moral symptoms of 
European cultural and political hegemony. This is not to argue, however, that 
European and Maori conceptions of authority and land-holding represent mutually 
sealed universes of discourse, only that we must pay attention to the ‘windows’ of 
communication between them. Such windows, I have argued, were formed when the 
fragmentation of European metaphysics helped give rise to a contextual 
historiography capable of showing the ‘regionality’ of this metaphysics; and when the 
establishment of inter-cultural bridgeheads — such as the Treaty of Waitangi itself — 
allowed diverse peoples to encounter each other’s metaphysics and cosmogonies on 
the disenchanted plains of an unfinished history. 
 
 
                                                
88  For a different view of this issue — in the Canadian context — see Mark Walters’ 
chapter in this volume. 
